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          Abstract 
 
The empirical relationship between financial openness and growth is examined in this paper.  In contrast to a 
large body of cross-country work investigating this link, I study the impact of financial integration on growth at 
the industry level.  This paper provides evidence that financial openness has a positive effect on growth of 
industrial sectors, regardless of their characteristics.  Moreover, industries that rely relatively more on external 
finance  grow  disproportionately  faster  in  countries  with  more  integrated  financial  systems.    However,  this 
industry-specific effect of financial openness decreases when I control for the development of the domestic 
financial  system.    Finally,  the  hypothesis  that  financial  integration  improved  growth  also  by  enhancing  the 
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Introduction 
 
The financial landscape has changed significantly since the beginning of the 1980s.  Several factors, including 
the  liberalization  of  international  capital  movements,  financial  deregulation  and  advances  in  information 
technology, have contributed to this change.  The result is an increase in cross-border capital flows, a greater 
presence of foreign banks and more international financial integration.   
The integration of national financial systems would be of little interest if it did not matter for long-run economic 
growth.  But does it?  Some economists argue that liberalizing the financial sector promotes the economy. A 
large literature finds that the level of a country’s financial development has a causal impact on its long-run 
economic performance (see  Levine, 1997).  Thus, by enhancing the development of  the domestic  financial 
system, financial integration can positively affect the economic growth rate.  Moreover, international financial 
integration  may  also  directly  affect  economic  performance.    Financial  openness  permits  better  resource 
allocation, portfolio diversification and access of domestic firms to foreign funds, allowing higher profitability 
and growth.   At the same time, sceptics argue that financial liberalization entails several risks.  They refer to the 
financial and currency crises that have followed financial liberalization in both industrialized and developing 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  These crises call into question the advisability of liberalizing restrictions on 
international capital flows.    
When theory provides conflicting predictions about the growth effects of financial integration, it is particularly 
interesting to look at the empirical evidence.  An extensive literature has been built up over the past five years on 
the impact of financial openness on economic growth.  The majority of these studies augment standard growth 
regressions with indicators of financial integration.  They all attempt to estimate whether economic growth is 
enhanced when a country allows its residents to borrow and lend internationally.  However, these attempts to 
establish a robust empirical link between financial liberalization and economic growth have so far not been very 
successful.   
This paper differs from previous research in several ways.  First, I leave the cross-country approach and analyze 
growth effects at the industry level.   I explore whether economic sectors that are relatively more in need of 
external finance grow disproportionately faster in more financially integrated countries.  This analysis is based 
on the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998).  Second, I examine the channels through which  
financial openness can have an impact on the economic activity of a country.   Although financial integration 
may  further  a  country’s  financial  development,  I  try  to  investigate  whether  measures  of  domestic  financial 
development can fully drive out the integration effect.  In other words, it is tested whether financial integration 
directly impacts industry growth.  Third, following Klein and Olivei (1999), I try to quantify the impact of 
financial openness on the development of the domestic financial system.  The sample in my analysis covers a 
longer  time-span,  more  indicators  of  international  financial  integration  and  other  measures  of  financial 
development.    Finally,  I  also  investigate  whether  the  impact  of  financial  integration  on  industry  growth  is 
contingent upon a country’s level of economic development. 
To anticipate my conclusions, I find that financial openness has a positive effect on growth of industrial sectors, 
regardless of their characteristics.  In addition, this paper provides evidence that industries that require relatively 
more  external  financing  grow  disproportionately  faster  in  countries  with  more  integrated  financial  systems.  
However, I also find that once I control for the level of domestic financial development, the industry-specific 
effect  of  financial  openness  decreases.    One  interpretation  of  this  result  is  that  the  integration  of  financial   4 
systems improved growth also by enhancing the development of the domestic financial system.    I find evidence 
in favor of this indirect transmission channel.  In particular, I find a significant effect of financial openness on 
the growth rate of financial development. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  The next section presents a brief summary of the theory and 








 describes the data.  In an econometric evaluation in section 
Ι
V, I try to assess the impact of financial openness on industry performance and on financial development.  
Section V concludes. 
 
I.  Theory and Previous Empirical Results 
 
a.  Theory 
 
An extensive literature finds that the level of a country’s financial development has a causal effect on its long-
run economic performance.  Thus, by improving the development of the domestic financial system, international 
financial integration can affect the economic growth rate.   There are many ways in which financial openness 
may be associated with local financial development 
First, financial integration is expected to enhance the development of the domestic banking system through 
increased competition in banking markets.  Foreign bank entry may increase competitive pressure (Claessens and 
Laeven , 2004), thereby forcing domestic banks to cut costs and prices of financial services.  Empirical evidence 
that foreign bank entry significantly reduces domestic bank profitability, net non-interest income and overhead 
expenses has been provided by Claessens,  Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001)
2.   Their results are consistent 
with the  hypothesis that in  the long run,  foreign bank entry improves  the  functioning of domestic banking 
markets
3.   Second, foreign banks may import best practices from abroad which domestic banks then copy.  
Thus, also by allowing countries to benefit from frontier financial technologies, foreign bank entry can enhance 
the  functioning  of  the  domestic  financial  system.    Third,  more  financial  integration  can  promote  domestic 
financial  development  by  improving  national  regulation  (corporate  governance,  accounting  standards,  bank 
supervision).  Convergence in regulatory standards is a prerequisite for an integrated market.  It is expected that 
this  convergence  will  result  in  an  improvement  in  the  national  regulation  of  the  less  financially  developed 
countries.    Evidence  that  a  good  regulatory  environment  is  important  for  the  development  of  the  domestic 
financial system has been provided by Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny  (1997).  Specifically, 
they show that countries with a good protection of shareholders have more valuable stock markets, a larger 
number of listed domestic firms per capita, and a higher rate of initial public offering activity than do countries 
with a weak protection.  They also find that countries that protect creditors better have larger credit markets.   
                                                 
2 Terell (1986), using aggregate accounting data for 14 developed countries, finds that countries which allowed foreign bank entry had lower 
gross interest margins, lower before-tax profits and lower operating costs.  McFadden (1994) also provides a study of the effect of removal of 
restrictions on foreign financial services providers in Australia and finds that this has led to improved domestic bank operations.  Evidence 
for the U.S. comes from Jayaratne and Strahan (1996,1998).  The show that relaxed branching restrictions within states in the U.S. have been 
associated with increased credit availability, enhanced bank efficiency, and faster economic growth. 
3 Buch and Heinrich (2002) replicate this analysis for OECD countries. In contrast to the previous study, the presence of foreign banks does 
not appear to significantly reduce profits or costs.  One reason for the discrepancy could be that Claessens et al. are looking at the efficiency 
of domestic banks only, whereas Buch et al. include both domestic and foreign banks.  In addition, the results of Claessens et al. may be 
driven primarily by the non-OECD, less developed countries in their sample.  The results suggest that in OECD countries, the levels of 
foreign entry observed so far have not significantly increased competitive pressure.     5 
Thus,  creditor  rights  and  shareholder  rights  encourage  the  development  of  lending  and  equity  markets, 
respectively. 
 
So far, I stated that financial integration can increase the economic growth rate by promoting the development of 
the domestic financial sector.  However, financial openness can also have a direct impact on the economic 
activity of a country.    
First, the integration of financial markets can increase the opportunities to diversify risk and thus improve risk 
sharing.  Improved portfolio diversification implies lower portfolio risk and thus lower rates of return required 
by investors to hold these portfolios.  This, in turn, should directly translate into a lower cost of capital inducing 
additional investment
4.  Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and Priestley (2004) find that, over the 1990s, the cost of 
equity capital within European Union sectors has fallen by between 0.5 and 3 percentage points. Also Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000 a,b) find that the cost of equity capital decreases significantly after financial 
liberalization.  Stulz (1999), however, finds it difficult to detect strong effects of liberalization on the cost of 
capital in emerging economies.  He argues that the existence of the home bias may well be the factor limiting the 
extent of the cost of capital decrease.    Improved risk sharing can also enhance growth by inducing a shift 
towards investment in projects with higher expected returns.  Obstfeld (1994) shows that international asset trade 
encourages countries to shift from low-return, safe investments towards high return, risky investments. Provided 
risky returns are imperfectly correlated across countries, and provided some risk free assets are initially held, a 
small rise in diversification opportunities always raises expected growth as well as national welfare.    
Second, it is expected that financial integration has an impact on economic activity beyond its impact on the 
local financial development because the latter may not gauge fully the degree of financial development available 
to the economy (Levine 1997, 2003).  As financial integration proceeds, firms of less financially developed 
countries can access more easily major financial centers by listing their shares abroad
5.  Moreover, the banks of 
more  developed  countries  can  provide  cross-border  loans  to  the  firms  of  less  advanced  countries.    These 
financial services are not included in the private domestic credit of both countries.  Therefore, as financial 
markets become more integrated, the size of the financial market of a given country as a measure of its degree of 
financial development loses significance.   Harrison, Love and McMillan (2002) state that the effect of financial 
liberalization on financing constraints in the host country can either be positive or negative.  Global capital 
flows, by bringing in scare capital, may ease host-country firm’s financing constraints.  However, if incoming 
foreign firms borrow heavily from domestic banks, they may exacerbate domestic firms’ financing constraints by 
crowding them out of domestic capital markets.   The results of their study suggest that the lifting of restrictions 
on the capital account is associated with a reduction in firm-level financing constraints
6.   Laeven (2003) also 
                                                 
4 European financial integration has also a direct effect on the cost of equity capital which consists of a reduction in real risk free rates.  In 
fact,  as  a precondition  to  EMU  entry,  inflation  and  interest  rates converged  among  EU  countries  towards  the typically  low  levels  of 
Germany, which used to be considered as benchmark.  This convergence resulted in lower real rates, implying that the opportunity cost of 
investing in equity decreased, reducing the cost of equity capital (Hardouvelis et al., 2004) 
5 According to Pagano, Roell and Zechner  (2002), firms list abroad because this may strengthen the competitive position of the company in 
its industry, by enhancing its reputation with suppliers, employees and customers.  Furthermore, firms cross-list for financial reasons: 
funding abroad may be cheaper or more easily available.  Pagano, Randl, Roell and Zechner (2001) report that European companies are more 
likely to cross-list in more liquid and larger markets, and in markets where several companies from their industry are already cross-listed.  
They are also more likely to cross-list in countries with better investor protection and more efficient courts and bureaucracy.  The higher 
standards of corporate governance or disclosure, improved liquidity, availability of analysts with superior technological knowledge of the 
industry, etc are expected to lower the cost of capital and increase the availability of equity finance. 
6 They interpret the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds as a proxy for the degree of financing constraints.   6 
finds that financial liberalization relaxes external financing constraints in developing countries, but only for 
small firms. 
 
b.  Empirical Evidence
7 
 
Only recently, attention has been paid in the empirical literature to the role of financial system openness in 
promoting economic growth.   The standard approach is to analyse the relation between different indicators of 
financial integration and economic growth across countries.   A more recent strand of empirical studies used 
industry-level data to identify the effect of financial openness on growth.  A schematic overview of these studies 
is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
A first group of cross-country empirical studies attempts to study the direct impact of financial liberalization on 
economic growth.  In a widely cited study, Rodrik (1998) regresses the growth of GDP per capita on the share of 
years when the capital account was free of restriction as measured by the binary indicator constructed by the 
IMF
8.  His sample includes almost 100 countries, industrialized as well as developing, and he uses data for the 
period 1975-1989.  Rodrik finds  no association between the level of capital account liberalization and economic 
growth.   In contrast, Quinn (1997) identifies a positive result between the change capital account liberalization 
and growth.  Using the Quinn index of capital account openness
9, the empirical estimates suggest that the change 
in this index has a strongly significant effect on the growth in real GDP per capita in his cross section of 58 
countries over the period 1960-1989.  The controversy between Rodrik and Quinn can be due to the use of 
different  indicators  of  capital  account  liberalization.    Also  important  may  be  that  the  country  coverage  is 
different
10.  In particular, Quinn considers fewer low-income developing countries.  This conjecture is supported 
by the results of Edwards (2001).  This author finds that financial liberalization is negatively associated with 
growth in poor countries but positively associated with growth in rich countries
11.  A plausible interpretation is 
that  a  good  institutional  and  financial  development  is  necessary  to  enjoy  the  positive  growth  effects  of 
international financial integration
12.    
A  second  round  of  cross-country  studies  directly  tests  the  hypothesis  that  the  effect  of  financial  openness 
depends  on  institutional  and  financial  development.    Kraay  (1998)  tests  whether  the  effect  of  financial 
liberalization depends on the strength of the financial system, the effectiveness of prudential supervision and 
regulation, and the quality of institutions.  Similarly, Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz  (2001) interact the level 
of financial liberalization with measures of financial development.  The results of both studies show that there is 
little evidence that the benefits of financial liberalization are contingent upon a country’s level of financial and 
                                                 
7 Two other recent surveys of the effects of capital account liberalization on economic growth are Eichengreen (2001) and Edison, Klein, 
Ricci and Slok (2004). 
8 The  IMF restriction measure is a zero-one dummy  variable that equals one in years  where there are restrictions on capital account 
transactions and zero in years where there are no restrictions on these external transactions.   The data are from the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.   
9 Quinn (1997) assigns scores associated to the intensity of official restrictions by reading through the IMF’s narrative descriptions of capital 
account restrictions.  This measure attempts to improve upon the IMF restriction measure by providing information about the magnitude of 
restrictions. 
10 Arteta et al. (2001) and Eichengreen (2001)  offer still other reasons for the differences in results between Rodrik and Quinn.   
11 In contrast to these results, Edison et al. (2002) find that the association of capital account liberalization with growth is stronger in non-
OECD countries. 
12 This argument can also be used to explain the differences in results of Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) and Grilli and Milesi- 
Ferretti  (1995).  The first study, using a sample of high income countries, finds evidence of a positive relation between capital account 
liberalization and economic growth.  The second study finds a negative relation, using a sample dominated by low-income countries.   7 
institutional development. However, Arteta et al. find that the elimination of macroeconomic imbalances is an 
essential prerequisite for capital account liberalization to have positive growth effects.    Klein (2003) presents 
evidence of an inverted-U shaped relationship between the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness 
and income per capita.  A similar inverted-U shaped relationship is found when they allow the effect of capital 
account openness on growth to vary with various indicators of government quality. 
A third class of cross-country studies focuses on the channels through which capital account liberalization might 
enhance growth.  That financial liberalization enhances financial development is supported by the results of 
Klein and Olivei (1999) and Levine and Zervos (1998).   Both studies find that financial liberalization has a 
positive  impact  on  domestic  financial  development.    However,  the  former  study  finds  that  the  correlation 
between capital account openness and financial deepening is limited to the OECD countries
13.  The results of the 
latter study indicate that the influence of financial liberalization on financial development is not restricted to 
high-income countries.  Levine and Zervos (1998) find for 16 developing countries that stock markets become 
larger  and  more  liquid  after  the  capital  account  is  opened.      Also  Levine  (2000)  provides  evidence  that 
international financial liberalization improves the functioning of the domestic financial markets.  First, he shows 
that liberalizing restrictions on international portfolio flows tends to enhance stock market liquidity.  Second, he 
provides evidence that allowing greater foreign bank presence tends to enhance the efficiency of the banking 
system.    Further,  Edison,  Levine,  Ricci  and  Slok  (2002)  find  that,  using  data  on  capital  flows  and  stocks, 
international financial integration is completely irrelevant for growth, once one controls for the level of domestic 
financial development.   According to his study, financial integration has no additional effect on economic 
growth, beyond the impact that it may have on financial deepening of the domestic financial market: highly 
integrated countries show a high degree of financial development and, as a consequence, high growth rates.  
However, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001) compare the growth performance of industrial and emerging 
economies before and after equity market liberalization.  Their estimates point to an important transmission 
channel  from  equity  market  liberalization.    Rising  international  capital  inflow  increases  the  availability  of 
resources, this induces a rising investment share that spurs real output growth.  They find that, in contrast with 
the  previous  studies,  although  financial  liberalization  furthers  financial  development,  measures  of  financial 
development fail to fully drive out the liberalization effect.  
 
To study the effect of financial openness on growth, the previous studies considered growth rates of country 
aggregates.  In this paper, I approach the problem by analysing growth effects at the industry level, using the 
methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998).   
In their analysis, Vlachos and Waldenstrom (2002) also use the methodology of Rajan and Zingales.  This is, 
they  test  if  industries  highly  dependent  on  external  financing  experience  a  faster  growth  in  countries  with 
liberalized capital accounts, liberalized equity markets, and that are well-integrated with global capital markets.  
Their main result is that growth in value added is unrelated to all the investigated dimensions of liberalization.  
They do, however find significant positive effects of financial liberalization on the creation of new firms and 
growth in production, given that countries have relatively well developed financial markets.   Giannetti, Guiso, 
Jappelli, Padula and Pagano (2002) study the potential impact of European financial integration on the ability of 
a country to grow faster.  They first run the same regressions as Rajan and Zingales.  Next, they simulate two 
                                                 
13 One interpretation of this result is that countries require a constellation of economic, legal and social institutions in order to have capital 
account liberalization translate to greater financial depth (Klein and Olivei, p2).      8 
possible scenarios.  First, they simulate the impact of raising the level of financial development in each EU 
country to the US level.  They consider the latter to be a valid benchmark.  In the second scenario, they estimate 
the impact of financial integration on growth raising the regulatory and legal standards to the highest current EU 
standard. Their simulations suggest that the benefits from financial openness can have potentially large effects 
on the growth of the European manufacturing industry, ranging from 0.75 to 0.94 percentage points per year 
depending  on  the  assumed  scenario.  Furthermore,  they  conclude  that  countries  that  currently  have  a  weak 
financial structure are expected to benefit most. 
 
 
II.  Empirical Methodology 
 
In the empirical analysis, the impact of financial system integration on the ability of an industry to grow faster is 
examined.   First, I investigate the economy-wide effect of financial integration on industry growth.  Then I test 
whether  there  is  evidence  of  an  industry-specific  effect.    In  particular,  I  ask  whether  financial  openness  
promotes the growth of those industries that are more in need of external finance by facilitating credit access to 
these sectors.  In addition, I am interested in the channels through which financial openness can contribute to 
industry  growth.  I  already  argued  that  financial  integration  may  boost  growth  through  enhancing  the 
development of the domestic financial system and/or through risk diversification and easier access to foreign 
funds.  In this paper, I try to identify these transmission channels in two ways.    First, I test whether financial 
openness has an effect on industry growth beyond its impact on domestic financial development.  This is, I test 
whether there’s evidence of a direct transmission channel.  Then, I investigate the relationship between financial 
integration and a country’s level of financial development. 
 
a.  Financial Integration and Industry Growth 
 
I begin by estimating  the economy-wide effect or first-order effect of financial integration on industry growth.  I 
ask whether industrial sectors, regardless of their characteristics,  grow more or less if they are in countries with 
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A subscript i indicates that the variable refers to the ith industry.  Similarly, a subscript j denotes country specific 
variables.   The dependent variable  Growth Value Addedi,j  is the growth rate in industry i in country j over the 
period 1980 to 1997 of real value added.    Fraction of Value Addedi,j  is industry i’s share of value added in 
manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) suggest this variable captures an industry-
specific convergence effect.  Industries that have grown substantially in the past are less likely to continue to 
grow at a high rate in the future.  Therefore, it is expected to have a negative sign.  The industry dummies correct   9 
for  every  possible  industry  specific  effect.      The  country  controls  that  should  affect  industry  growth    are 
explanatory variables used in standard cross-country growth regressions
14.  In particular, I include variables for 
initial  economic  development,  human  capital,  government  size,  trade  openness  and  financial  development.  
Finally,  the  coefficient  on  the  level  of  financial  integration  estimates  the  economy-wide  effect  of  financial 
openness  on  industry  growth.  A  positive  and  significant  coefficient 
β 4    indicates  that  financial  integration 
promotes growth of all industries, regardless of  their characteristics. 
 
The analysis of a first order effect is similar to the cross-country studies investigating the importance of financial 
openness for growth.  The contribution of this paper to previous literature is that I introduce heterogeneity across 
industrial sectors.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that industries differ in their dependence on external finance.  
I want to investigate whether financially dependent industries are likely to be better off in countries with more 
open financial systems.  If the integration of financial systems removes or reduces barriers to external financing, 
industries  highly  dependent  on  external  finance  should  grow  disproportionately  faster  in  countries  more 
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In this model, the interaction between the industry’s external financial dependence and an indicator of financial 
openness is included.  The existence of an industry specific effect is consistent with a positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term.   
External Dependencei is defined as the share of capital expenditures that the median firm in industry i cannot 
finance through internal cash flow.  Since the problem of information acquisition is less severe for older firms, it 
is expected that these firms can more easily raise funds from foreign banks or financial markets. If this is the 
case, the financial openness effect should be stronger for more mature firms in the industry.  Since Rajan and 
Zingales provide information on the financial needs of the more mature firms, I am able to test this hypothesis.  
Thus, I run the above regression model calculating the interaction term using both the financial dependence 
proxy for all firms and  the dependence measure for firms more than ten years old. 
Further, the country control variables from model (1) are replaced by country dummies.  Using both country and 
industry dummies allows to control for the country and industry characteristics, and thus, to eliminate possible 
biases  caused  by  omitted  country-  or  industry-specific  regressors,  or  model  misspecification.  In  this 
specification, the effect of any omitted variable that does not vary simultaneously across countries and industries 
is absorbed by either the country dummy variables or the industry dummies.       
 
                                                 
14 See Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004)   10 
I already discussed the channels whereby financial integration can affect growth.  I stated that one way through 
which the integration of financial markets can increase the long-run growth rate is by fostering the development 
of  the  domestic  financial  sector.    I  also  have  seen  that  financial  openness  may  offer  risk  diversification 
opportunities and possibilities to firms to find funds abroad, which in turn may have an effect on industry 
growth.  Thus,  financial integration  may  have an impact on industry  growth beyond its effect on  financial 
development.  This hypothesis can be tested by adding to regression model (2) an interaction between industry 
i’s  dependence  on  external  financing  and  the  level  of  financial  development  in  country  j  .    The  estimated 
coefficient on this interaction term is the focus of Rajan and Zingales analysis.  If this coefficient is significant 
and positive, then this implies that industries that are more dependent on external financing do better in countries 
with better financial systems.  The focus of my analysis is on the coefficient on the interaction between financial 
integration and financial dependence.  A positive and significant coefficient indicates that financial integration 
has an effect on industry growth beyond developing the domestic financial system.   The model I estimate to test 
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As is common in the growth regression framework, there may be potential concerns about the endogeneity of 
regressors.    Therefore,  I  will  run  two-stage  least  squares  instrumental  variables  regressions  parallel  to  the 
ordinary least squares regressions in order to check for the potential reversed causality.   
 
b.  Financial Integration and Financial Development 
 
Financial integration can have a positive effect on economic growth through its impact on domestic financial 
development.  This is the next issue I want to investigate.  More specifically, I want to know whether a high 
degree of financial integration leads to an increasing degree of financial development.    If such a relation exists, 
then it would follow that financial integration has an indirect effect on economic growth through the promotion 
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where Growth Financial Development j  is country j’s growth rate of financial development over the period 1980 
to 1997.   Financial Integration  j is the variable of interest and indicates country j’s  level of  international 
financial integration.  In the regression I take into account financial convergence, which is captured by the   11 
logarithm of the level of financial development in the initial year.  It is expected that countries with initially 
lower levels of financial development experience greater financial deepening over the period 1980-1997 than 
those countries that begin the period with more developed financial markets.  Evidence of financial convergence 
would be obtained with the finding of significant and negative values of this coefficient. Klein and Olivei remark 
that including the initial level of financial depth is also important for obtaining accurate estimates of the effect of 
financial integration if the various indicators of initial financial development are correlated with the measure of 
financial  integration.      The  sample  correlation  coefficients  are  between  0.26  and  0.37  and  are  statistically 
significant.  Thus, if financial convergence is present, the omission of (log) Financial Development 1980 j from 
the regression would cause a downward bias in the estimated coefficient on financial integration. 
The control variable that is included in the regression is the (logarithm of the) 1980 level of real GDP per capita. 
 
 
III.  Data 
 
In the empirical analysis, different datasets are merged.   First, data on industry’s dependence on external finance 
are taken from Rajan and Zingales (1998).   Second, growth in value added is from the Industrial Statistics 
Database  which  is  produced  by  the  United  Nations  Statistical  Division.    Third,  the  measures  of  financial 
development are drawn from the dataset constructed by Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001).  Fourth, measures of 
financial  integration  are  constructed  with  data  from  the  IMF’s  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange 




a.  Data on Financial Integration 
Measuring the extent to which a country is financially liberalized or integrated is not straightforward.  In my 
analysis, I use two rule-based indicators. Both indicators are derived from information in the Annual Report of 
the International Monetary Fund’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).   In it, the 
IMF reports a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the country has capital controls in place in a given 
year, and zero otherwise.  For each country, the variable Share is calculated, which represents the proportion of 
years between 1980 and 1995 in which the country had no restrictions on capital mobility.  A higher value 
denotes a higher degree of capital mobility.  A number of cross-country studies, including Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995), Kraay (1998), Rodrik (1998) and Klein and Olivei (1999), Chanda (2001) and Klein (2003) used 
a similar variable, though using different time-spans.   The measure has the advantage that it covers a wide range 
of countries.  However, it is an imperfect proxy for financial openness as it  does not distinguish between the 
type of flow that is being restricted.  Moreover,  it does not capture the intensity of capital controls.    
The second measure for financial openness represents an effort to measure the intensity of enforcement of capital 
controls.  Quinn (1997) attempts to capture this intensity through a careful reading of the narrative descriptions 
published in the AREAER.  He scores separately the intensity of controls for capital account receipts and capital 
account  payments.    For  each  of  these  two  categories  the  coding  rule  is  as  follows:  a  score  of  0  indicates 
transactions are forbidden, 0.5 indicates that there are quantitative or other regulatory restrictions, 1 indicates 
                                                 
15 In this paper I use two different samples.  The first sample includes 27 industries in 45 countries and is used for our industry-level 
regressions.  The second sample includes 65 countries and is used to investigate the impact of financial integration on the development of the 
domestic financial sector.   12 
that authorities have to approve the transaction or that transactions are subject to heavy taxes, the 1.5 score is 
used when there are less severe taxes, and 2 indicates that transactions are free of restrictions or taxes.  The sum 
of the values for the two categories is an indicator of overall capital account openness that ranges between 0 and 
4.  A larger value indicates more financial openness.  This measure is available annually from 1950 to 1997 for  
OECD countries, and for the years 1958, 1973, 1982, and 1988 for non-OECD countries.   In this paper, the 
1988 value, Quinn88, and the average value of Quinn’s indicator for the years 1982 and 1988, Quinn82-88 
16 is 
used.  Table 2 contains the list of countries in the dataset and the corresponding measures of financial openness.  
As can be seen from the correlation matrix, given in Table 3, the variables Share, Quinn88 and, Quinn82-88 are 
highly correlated with each other.  The correlation coefficients for these variables are statistically significant at 
better than a one percent level
17.    
 
In  order  to  check  for  potential  reversed  causality,  I  will  run  two-stage  least  squares  instrumental  variables 
regressions  parallel  to  the  ordinary  least  squares  regression.        Therefore,  I  need  instruments  for  financial 
openness. 
Figure 1  presents the evolution of financial openness for the sub-samples African, Asian, Latin-American and 
OECD countries.  From this figure,  you can infer that financial liberalization over the period 1980 to 1995  
largely took place in industrial countries and to a much less extent in developing countries.  I also find that 
within this last group, it are largely the Latin American countries that have re-opened their capital accounts since 
the  mid  1980’s.    This  dependence  of  financial  liberalization  on  the  region  of  the  country  offers  a  set  of 
instrumental variables.  Specifically, I use dummy variables for Asian, African and Latin American countries.  I 
also include a dummy variable which equals one when a country had no restrictions on her capital account in the  
year 1985
18.  This is, I assume that countries maintained the same regime towards their capital account as in 
1985.  This dummy variable, however, may not be appropriate for solving the issue of  reversed causality, since 
it may be a leading indicator rather than a cause of growth in financial development.   
Table 4 presents the results of the regression of the financial integration proxy on the instruments mentioned 
above.   Both the variable Share and the Quinn88 index are used as indicator of financial openness.  From 
columns (a) and (d), it can be seen that most countries maintained the same stance towards their capital account 
as in the year 1985.  Columns (b) and (e) show that regional dummy variables also explain an important fraction 
of the variation in the degree of financial openness.  It can be seen that, among the developing countries, the 
Latin  American  countries  have  the  most  open  capital  markets  while  the  African  countries  have  the  largest 
restrictions on capital mobility.  These results are consistent with the evidence provided in Figure 1.  Column (c) 
and (f) present the results of the regressions including both a dummy indicating the stance of the capital controls 
in 1985 and regional dummies.  The results show that these variables explain very well the variation in the 
degree of financial liberalization.  
 
                                                 
16 I thank Dennis Quinn for sharing his data with me. 
17 See Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (2004) for a comparison of these indicators of financial openness. 
18 These variables are also the instruments for financial liberalization used by Klein and Olivei (1999).   13 
b.  Data on other variables 
 
Industry Growth.  In this paper, the empirical relevance of financial openness on industry growth is tested.  
Therefore, the dependent variable in the model specification is the growth rate of real value added over the 
period 1980 to 1997.  The data I use are from the United Nations Industrial Statistics Database and covers 
manufacturing firms
19 at the three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) level.   Value 
added was first expressed in U.S. dollars and then converted into real figures using the U.S. Producer Price Index 
deflator
20.  The sample includes data for 27 manufacturing industries in 45 countries. 
External Financial Dependence.  The financial dependence of industry i is defined as the share of capital 
expenditures that the median firm in the industry cannot finance through internal cash flow.  Therefore, it is 
computed as capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations, divided by capital expenditures.  Rajan and 
Zingales  employ  data  from  Standard  and  Poor’s  Compustat  for  U.S.  firms.    In  order  to  smooth  temporal 
fluctuations and reduce the effects of outliers, data on the firm’s external finance and capital expenditures are 
averaged over the period 1980-1990
21.  The median value is then used to indicate the external dependency for 
each respective industry.       
I already mentioned that it is expected that the more mature firms in the industry will benefit the most from 
financial openness.  As the problem of information acquisition is less severe for these companies, they can more 
easily have access to foreign funds.  Since Rajan and Zingales report the external financial dependence of all 
companies as well as for mature companies (firms that were listed for more than ten years), I am able to test this 
hypothesis. Using the dependence measure of the older firms restricts the sample to 25 industries. 
Financial  Development.    Recent  literature  has  constructed  a  number  of  indicators  that  aim  to  proxy  for 
development of financial intermediaries and stock markets across countries.  I use four different indicators for 
financial development.  The first measure is Private Credit, which equals the value of loans made by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP.  This indicator excludes credit 
to the public sector and claims of one group of intermediaries on another.  Second, to assess stock market 
development I employ Stock Market Capitalization, which is the value of listed domestic shares on domestic 
exchanges divided by GDP.   This indicator measures the overall size of the equity market relative to the size of 
the  economy.    The  overall  size  of  the  financial  sector  can  be  measured  by  the  sum  of  Stock  Market 
Capitalization and Private Credit, which I call Financial Depth.  Another typical measure for the overall size of 
the  financial  system is Liquid Liabilities.  This indicator equals currency plus demand and interest bearing 
liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries divided by GDP.  The data for these four indicators are 
averages over the period 1980 to 1997.   The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that all measures of financial 
development are highly correlated with each other.   The correlation coefficients are between 0.48 and 0.90 and 




                                                 
19 Rajan and Zingales (1998) note that the industries in the dataset all belong to manufacturing in order to reduce the dependence on country-
specific factors, like natural resources. 
20 The U.S. PPI deflator is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. (www.stls.frb.org/fred/) 
21 The time-period of our study is 1980-1997.  However, the external finance dependence proxy, which is a crucial variable in our analysis, is 
calculated using 1980’s data only and may vary over time.  Therefore, a more updated version of this measure would be more correct.  Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) find that the correlation between the external finance dependence proxy for the 1970’s and this for the 1980’s is 0.75.   14 
IV.  Empirical Results 
 
Using the data and econometric techniques outlined above, this section presents the regression results concerning 
the  relationship  between  financial  integration,  financial  development  and  industry  growth.    First,  I  present 
evidence of an economy-wide effect of financial integration.     Then, I concentrate on the industry-specific 
effect and test whether this effect is robust.  Finally, I report whether financial integration can enhance growth 
through its impact on a country’s financial development. 
 
a.  Economy-wide Effect 
 
Before estimating the industry-specific effect of financial integration, this is, the differential effect of financial 
integration on growth across industries that differ in their dependence on external finance, it might be interesting 
to analyze first the economy-wide effect of financial openness.  This means that I investigate whether financial 
integration has a positive or negative effect on industrial sectors, regardless of their characteristics.  The model 
specification is given by (1).  The country-specific variables are similar to the explanatory variables of standard 
growth regressions.  I include variables for financial development, initial economic development, government 
size, education and trade openness
22.    Financial Depth, the ratio of the sum of private credit and stock market 
capitalization over GDP, is a used as proxy for financial development.  The expected sign for this term is 
positive.  The logarithm of per capita income in 1980 captures a convergence effect,  and is therefore expected to 
have a negative sign.  The level of government expenditures is the ratio of government consumption to GDP.   
The level of human capital is measured as the average years of schooling attained by the population over 25 
years in 1980, and is also expected to have a positive coefficient.  Trade openness is measured as the sum of real 
imports and exports over GDP.  It is expected that more open countries have higher growth rates.  The model 
includes industry dummies to control for any industry-specific effect.    The industry’s fraction of value added is 
also included.  The focus is on the sign and significance of the coefficient on the financial integration variable. 
The  model  specification  (1)  is  estimated  with  ordinary  least  squares  and  two-stage  instrumental  variables 
regressions to account for the potential endogeneity of financial openness.  Only the IV estimates are reported 
because the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic test rejects the unbiasedness of    the OLS estimates.  The instruments 
are region dummy variables and a dummy indicating one when a country had no restrictions on its capital 
account in 1985. 
In Table 5, the results of the first-order effect of financial openness are presented.  The dependent variable is the 
growth rate of real value added for each sector in each country over the period 1980 to 1997.   Columns (a)-(d) 
report the regression results using Share as indicator of financial integration, adding one country control variable 
at a time.  The fraction of value added in manufacturing is negative and significant different from zero, as a 
priori expected.  The country control variables also have the expected sign, although some of them are not 
statistically significant. More important for this analysis, is that the coefficient on the indicator of financial 
integration is positive and statistically significant (at one- or five-percent level) in all regressions.  This result 
suggests  that,  controlling  for  other  variables,    the  integration  of  financial  systems  promotes  growth  of  all 
industries, indiscriminately.   To offer an indication of the economic significance of this financial openness 
effect, I focus on the results in column (d).  When the financial openness measure, Share, increases from the first 
                                                 
22 These variables are drawn from the database of Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001)   15 
to the third quartile of its distribution, growth in value added will increase with 11 percentage points over the 
period 1980 to 1997.  For comparison, the average growth rate of real value added is 38 percent.  The economy-
wide effect of financial openness on growth is thus significant, both statistically and economically.    
It is worth noting that the above result is robust to the use of alternative indicators of financial integration.  I re-
estimate specification (1) using the Quinn88 and Quinn82-88 index.  The results, not reported here, show that the 
coefficient on the level of financial openness remains positive and significant (at a one-percent level).   
  
b.  Sector-specific Effect 
 
I now add to model (1) the interaction term between the industry’s dependence on external finance and an 
indicator of financial integration.   This model specification allows testing whether there is, besides an economy-
wide effect, also a sector-specific effect of financial integration.  If financial openness facilitates credit access, 
this  effect  should  be  especially  noticeable  on  those  industrial  sectors  where  firms  are  highly  dependent  on 
external finance.   Columns (e)-(h) of Table 5 report the results, again, adding one country control variable at a 
time.   It can be seen that the coefficient on the level of financial openness, as well as the coefficient on the 
interaction  term  is  positive  and  significant.    This  suggests  that,  besides  a  positive  effect  on  growth  of  all 
industries, financial integration has an additional positive influence on sectors where firms are dependent on 
external finance, by facilitating credit access to these firms.
23  
Next,  I  test  whether  the  industry-specific  effect  of  financial  integration  is  robust  by  concentrating  on  the 
interaction term only.  In particular, I exclude the country control variables from the model and, in addition to 
industry  dummies,  I  add  country  dummies.    Therefore,  I  eliminate  possible  biases  due  to  omitted  country-
specific variables and reduce the concern of endogeneity of the financial openness indicator
24.  This more robust 
specification is given by (2).  It means that I analyze whether industries that are relatively more dependent on 
external  finance  grow  disproportionately  faster  in  countries  with  more  integrated  financial  systems.    The 
dependent variable is the growth rate in real value added in a particular sector in a particular country over the 
period 1980-1997.  The indicator for financial openness is Share. 
The results, using OLS, are presented in Table 6.  First I report in column (a), as a benchmark, the results of the 
basic Rajan and Zingales specification using Financial Depth as proxy for financial development.  I find that 
industrial sectors that rely relatively more on external finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with 
more developed financial  systems, as the coefficient for the interactive variable external dependence times 
Financial Depth is statistically significant.   This result is consistent with the findings of Rajan and Zingales.   
As can be seen from column (b), the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between Share and financial 
dependence is also positive and  statistically significant.   This result suggests that financial integration promotes 
growth of those industries that are more in need of external finance by facilitating credit access to firms.  As 
column (a) and (b) show, there is also evidence of an industry-specific convergence effect.  The coefficient 
estimate for the initial share of total value added in manufacturing is negative and statistically significant.     
                                                 
23 I also included, as additional control variable, the interaction between external financial dependence and an indicator for domestic financial 
development.  It appears that, once I control for the sector-specific effect of financial development, the coefficient on the financial openness 
interaction term falls substantially and becomes insignificant.  This result, not reported in the paper, does not support the hypothesis that 
financial openness directly affects industry growth. 
24 See section 2.a.   16 
Further it is tested whether there is evidence of a direct transmission channel from financial openness to growth.  
A  way  to  test  this  hypothesis  it  is  to  augment  regression  model  (2)  with  an  interaction  term  between  the 
industry’s dependence on external finance and a measure of domestic financial development.   The specification 
is given by model (3).  If financial openness has an effect beyond developing the domestic financial system, the 
interaction term between financial dependence and an indicator of financial integration should have a positive 
and significant coefficient.  The results, presented in Column (c) of Table 6, show that more financial integration 
does not seem to have any direct effects on industry growth in real value added.  This is, once I control for the 
impact of domestic financial development, the coefficient on the interaction term between external dependence 
and financial openness becomes insignificant.  This finding is consistent with the results of Edison et al. (2002), 




I already mentioned that it is expected that financial openness is more favorable for the older companies, because 
of the problem of information acquisition on new and younger firms.  If the integration of financial systems  
reduces the financing constraints of older, existing firms, then is should be that industries where mature firms are 
more in need of external finance grow disproportionately faster in countries with more open financial systems.  
To test this hypothesis, I re-estimate the regression models using a proxy for financial dependence of the more 
mature firms in the industries, that is, establishments more than ten years old.  Columns (e)-(g) of Table 6 report 
the  results  of  the  regression  models,  this  time  calculating  the  interaction  terms  using  the  external  financial 
dependence indicator of the older firms.  Column (e) reports, as a benchmark, the results of the basic Rajan and 
Zingales regression.  As can be seen from column (f), the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between 
Share  and  external  dependence  is  positive  and  statistically  significant.    This  result  provides  evidence  that 
financial integration promotes growth of industries where older firms are relatively more dependent on external 
finance by facilitating credit access to these firms.   
Further it appears that, in contrast to the findings when external dependence of all firms is used,   more financial 
openness does have a direct impact on industry growth in real value added (see column (g)).  This is, even when 
I  control  for  the  effect  of  domestic  financial  development,  the  coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  between 
external financial dependence and Share remains significant (five-percent level).   The results also show that the 
positive relation between the level of domestic financial development and industry growth in real value added is 
robust  to  controlling  for  financial  integration.    The  coefficient  of  the  interaction  term  between  external 
dependence and Financial Depth remains positive and significant.   
To see the economic significance, consider two industries:  a sector where older firms are heavily dependent on 
external  finance  (Machinery)  and  a  sector  where  older  firms  have  a  low  dependence  on  external  finance 
(Glass)
25.  The coefficient estimate predicts that the Machinery sector will grow about 6 percent points faster 
relative to the other sector if financial integration were to increase from the first to the third quartile of its 
distribution.  For comparison, the growth rate of real value added is, on average, 38 percent over the period 




                                                 
25 The external financial dependence proxies for the mature firms in these industries are 0.2166 and 0.031, respectively.   17 
c.  Robustness Tests 
 
In what follows, I continue testing the robustness of the industry-specific effect of financial openness.   The 
dependent variable is still the growth rate of real value added in each industry in each country over the period 
1980 to 1997.   The interaction terms are calculated using both the external financial dependence proxy of all 
firms and the dependence proxy of the more mature firms in the sector. 
A first concern is that the results depend on the choice of the financial openness measure.  Therefore,  I  check 
whether the findings are robust to alternative definitions of financial integration.  First, I run regression  model  
(2) using Quinn82-88 as indicator of financial openness. The results, not reported in the paper, are consistent 
with prior findings.  Industries that are relatively more dependent on external finance grow disproportionately 
faster  in  countries  with  more  open  financial  systems,  irrespective  of  the  choice  of  the  external  financial 
dependence proxy.  Further, the results of model (3) using the Quinn82-88 indicator are presented in column (d) 
and (h) of Table 6.  As can be seen from column (d), when the external financial dependence proxy for all firms 
is used, the coefficient on the financial openness interaction term is not significant  However, when the terms of 
interaction are calculated using the external dependence of the older firms, the magnitude of the coefficient on 
this interaction term increases.  The findings using the Quinn82-88 indicator are thus similar to the results 
obtained using Share as measure of financial integration
26.  Therefore, I continue to use Share as the benchmark 
indicator of financial openness. 
Next, I investigate whether the results of model (3) are robust to the use of alternative measures of financial 
development.  In  particular,  I  employ  the  bank  development  indicator,  Private  Credit,  and  stock  market 
development  indicator,  Stock  Market  Capitalization.    The  results  are  reported  in  Table  7.    The  financial 
development and financial openness indicators are, again,  interacted using both the dependence of external 
finance of all firms (see column (a)-(d)) and the external dependence of the more mature companies (see column 
(e)-(h)).  When running the basic Rajan and Zingales regression I find that,  irrespective of the choice of the 
financial dependence measure, the coefficients on the financial development interaction terms are positive and 
statistically significant at a one- or five-percent level.    I then add the interactive variable between financial 
integration and external dependence to the model.  As Table 7 indicates, the financial openness interaction effect 
is positive and statistically significant when the terms of interaction are calculated using the external financial 
dependence of the more mature firms.  Again, these results are consistent with the previous findings,  using 
Financial Depth as indicator of financial development.  
Another possible concern is that financial integration is a proxy for other country characteristics.   Financial 
openness may be a proxy for the level of human capital, a country’s economic or institutional development, or 
the level of trade openness
27.  Consequently, the relationship I found between financial openness and industry 
growth could underlie a relationship between one of these country characteristics and growth in value added
28.  
Therefore, to test the robustness of my basic results to this argument, I add an interaction term between external 
financial dependence and an indicator for these country variables.  In columns (a)-(d) from Table 8, I report the 
results of the regressions where the interaction between external financial dependence and, respectively,  Human 
                                                 
26 Similar results are also obtained when I replace the financial openness proxy by Quinn88.      
27 The correlation between financial openness and human capital, economic development, institutional development and trade openness is 
respectively 0.41***, 0.42***, 0.35*** and 0.20.  Three stars denote that the correlation is statistically different from zero at the one-percent 
level. 
28 The results can only be explained by these country characteristics when  the dependence of  industries on these characteristics is strongly 
correlated with their external financial dependence.   18 
Capital, Log of income per capita, Rule of Law and Trade are added to model (3).  The terms of interaction are 
calculated using the external dependence of mature firms.  The indicator for financial development is Private 
Credit
29.    As  the  coefficient  estimates  show,    the  included  interaction  terms  are  not  statistically  significant 
(except  the  trade  interaction  term),  while  the  financial  openness  interaction  term  remains  positive  and 
statistically  significant.    The  results  suggest  that  financial  integration  is  not  a  proxy  for  other  country 
characteristics. 
Finally,  I check whether the results are robust to the estimation technique.  Ordinary least squares estimation 
assumes that there’s no simultaneity or reversed causality problem.  However,  Kraay (1998) distinguishes two 
sources of the endogeneity problem.  A first source of endogeneity is that capital controls may be correlated with 
other fundamental determinants of growth.   The second is that policymakers may impose capital controls in 
response to cyclical fluctuations.  This is, if countries relax controls in good times and impose them in bad times, 
one would find a spuriously positive effect of financial liberalization on growth.  Therefore, I run the same 
regressions using instrumental variables for financial integration.   I find that the financial openness interaction 
variable is statistically significant only when I do not control for domestic financial development.  However,  a 
Hausman test of the hypothesis that OLS is consistent cannot reject the null.   
 
 
d.   Sub-sample Stability 
 
An  important  policy  question  is  whether  the  effect  of  financial  openness  on  industry  growth  is  similar  in 
industrialized as in developing countries.  In the paper, this hypothesis is tested in two ways.  First, I add an extra 
interaction term to specification model (3): the interaction between external financial dependence, a proxy of 
financial integration and a dummy variable indicating one when the country is a developed country.  Second, I 
split the  sample of countries into two sub-samples: industrialized and developing countries.    
Column (a) of Table 9 presents the results of the extended model, using OLS.  The indicators for financial 
development  and  financial  openness  are,  respectively,  Financial  Depth  and  Share.  Both  the  financial 
development interaction term and the financial integration interaction term maintain positive and significant.  
Moreover, the coefficient on the new interaction term is negative and statistically significant at better than a five-
percent level, indicating that the effect of financial integration on industry growth is smaller for the developed 
countries.  Focusing on the size of the coefficient on the new interaction term, it appears that the effect of 
financial openness on industry growth varies substantially across the sub-samples of countries.  The magnitude 
of the financial openness effect is estimated to be approximately 80 percent weaker in countries characterized by 
a higher level of economic development.  This finding is robust to the use of instrumental variables for financial 
integration.  As can be seen from column (b), the magnitude of the dummy interaction term increases somewhat. 
The sub-sample regression results are also reported in Table  9.  From column (c), it can be seen that financial 
integration has a positive effect on industry growth in developing countries.  The coefficient on the financial 
openness interaction term remains significant at a one-percent level when we control for domestic financial 
development (see column (d)).  Moreover, these findings are robust to the use of instrumental variables.  The 
results using IV estimation are reported in columns (e) and (f).     
                                                 
29 Similar results are obtained with Financial Depth as indicator of financial development, however, the number of observations is then 
smaller.   19 
To see the economic significance, again, I consider two industries where mature firms differ in their dependence 
on  external  finance:  Glass  (low  financial  dependence)  and  Machinery  (high  financial  dependence).    The 
coefficient estimate for Share predicts that the Machinery industry will grow about 12 percentage points faster, 
over the period 1980-1997, than the Glass sector if financial openness were to increase from the first to the third 
quartile of its distribution.   For comparison, the average growth rate in real value added for developing countries 
is  49  percent  for  the  period  1980  to  1997.    So  the  financial  integration  effect  is  both  statistically  and 
economically significant. 
As  can  be  seen  from  columns  (g)-(j),  the  coefficient  on  the  financial  integration  interaction  term  is  not 
statistically different from zero when the sub-sample of industrialized countries is used.   Both the evidence of 
the extended model and the evidence of the sub-samples thus suggest that financial integration only promotes 
growth in sufficiently poor countries.  Similar results were found by Edison et al. (2002).  In contrast, Edwards 
(2001) and Arteta et al. (2001) argue that financial liberalization positively affects growth only after a country 
has achieved a certain level of economic development.   
It is interesting to note that if instead of using Share as indicator of financial openness, the Quinn82-88 or 
Quinn88 index is used, I obtain similar results.  The above results are thus robust to alternative indicators of 
financial integration.  The sub-sample regression results using the Quinn88 index as indicator are presented in 
Table 10.     
 
 
e.  Financial Development Effect 
 
The results reported above provide evidence of an industry-specific effect of financial openness.  In particular, I 
find that industries where firms are more dependent on external finance have a relatively higher growth rate if 
they are in countries with more open financial systems.  However, the evidence also indicates that when the 
financial development interaction term is added to the regression model, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between external financial dependence and financial openness decreases.  One interpretation of this result may 
be that the integration of financial systems improved growth also by increasing the level of domestic financial 
development
30.  This hypothesis of an indirect transmission channel from financial integration to industry growth 
will be examined here. 
I use the approach of Klein and Olivei, which is given by specification (4).    Following these authors, the 
proportion of years over a certain period in which there was no restriction on capital mobility is used as measure 
of financial openness.  I extend their time-span from 1980 to 1995.   Further, I add to their analysis by examining 
whether the relationship between financial openness and growth in financial development is robust to other 
indicators of financial integration.  Moreover, I extend their number of measures of financial development.  
Specifically,  four  different  indicators  of  domestic  financial  development  are  used:  Private  Credit,  Liquid 
Liabilities, Stock Market Capitalization and Financial Depth
31.     
Estimation results for specification (4) using Share as proxy for financial integration are shown in Table 11.  I 
find that the estimated coefficient on Share is positive and statistically different from zero at a 1- or 5-percent 
                                                 
30 In this paper, I provided evidence that domestic financial development positively affects industry growth. 
31 The three indicators of financial deepness used in the analysis of Klein and Olivei are: the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of 
claims on the non-financial private sector to GDP and the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to the sum of deposit money bank 
domestic assets and central bank domestic assets.      20 
level.  This provides evidence that countries with open capital accounts over the period 1980 to 1995 had a 
significantly greater increase in the growth of domestic financial development than countries with continuing 
capital account restrictions, even after controlling for financial convergence.  This result, however, does not hold 
when Stock Market Capitalization is used as measure of financial development (see column (e)).   With this 
indicator, I find the correct sign for the coefficient on financial liberalization, but the effect is not statistically 
different from zero.  Further, in all regressions, except when Financial Depth is used as indicator of financial 
development, I find that coefficient on the logarithm of initial financial development is negative and significant 
at a 1- or 5-percent level.  This is evidence in favor of financial convergence.   Countries with initially lower 
levels  of  financial  development  caught  up  to  those  countries  that  began  the  period  with  a  higher  level  of  
development of their financial market.     
It should be noticed that there might be a potential for simultaneity bias, since a country’s policy towards the 
capital account may depend upon the level of development of its domestic financial system.   Klein and Olivei 
argue that ‘capital account convertibility is often seen as the logical culmination of developing a deep, mature, 
and efficient financial system (p.10)’.  The results would be biased towards finding a positive relation between 
financial liberalization and financial development if countries experiencing a deepening of their financial system 
for reasons other than financial liberalization also open up their capital account.  Therefore, I also estimate 
specification  (4)  using  instrumental  variables  for  financial  openness.    However,  a  Hausman  test  for  the 
hypothesis that OLS is consistent can only reject the null when Financial Depth and Stock Market Capitalization 
are used as measures of financial development.   
The results of the two-stage instrumental variables regressions are also presented in Table 11.  Columns (b), (d), 
(f)  and  (h)  provide  evidence  of  a  significant  effect  of  financial  liberalization  on  the  growth  of  financial 
development.   The IV estimates are positive and significant at a one- or five-percent level.  The results using IV 
regression  also  provide  strong  support  for  financial  convergence.    All  estimates  of  the  coefficients  on  the 
logarithm of initial financial development are significantly different from zero, except when Financial Depth is 
used as measure.   
To gauge the magnitude of the effect of financial liberalization on the growth in financial development I consider 
the ceteris paribus effect of an increase in the indicator Share  from zero (no capital mobility) to the sample 
mean (0.3).  The estimated coefficient on financial openness suggest that this would lead to an increase in the 
growth rate of Financial Depth  of approximately 25 percentage points over the period 1980 to 1997.  For 
comparison, the average growth rate of  Financial Depth is 65 percent.  Similarly, the increase in the growth rate 
of Private Credit and Liquid Liabilities would be about 22 and 13 percentage points, respectively.   The indirect 
transmission channel of financial openness is thus both statistically and economically significant. 
Further, I  test whether the relationship between domestic financial development and financial openness is robust 
to other measures of financial integration.  The results using Quinn82-88 as measure of financial openness, 
reported in Table 12, are similar with the ones I find using the indicator Share.   The only difference is that I do 
not find a statistically significant effect anymore of financial integration when growth in Financial Depth is used 
as dependent variable.  
Finally,  I  investigate  whether  the  effect  of  financial  liberalization  on  financial  development  depends  on  a 
country’s level of economic development.  This hypothesis is tested in two ways.  First, I run regression model 
(4) for the two sub-samples: industrialized countries and developing countries.   The results can be seen from   21 
Table 13.  For the OECD countries I find, for both OLS and IV regressions, a statistically significant effect of 
financial openness on the growth in Private Credit and Liquid Liabilities (see column (a)-(d)).      I also find 
evidence of a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on the growth in Private Credit or Liquid 
Liabilities in the developing countries
32 (see column (e)-(h)).  The magnitude of the coefficient estimates is 
somewhat lower for these countries compared to the industrialized countries, but they remain significant at a 1- 
or 5-percent level.  Second,  I include in specification (4) an interaction term between Share and a dummy 
variable indicating one when the country is a developed country.  The coefficient estimate on this interaction 
term, not reported in the paper, is not significant different from zero
33.  This provides evidence that financial 
liberalization offers more or less the same benefits to developing countries as to industrialized countries with 
respect to its promotion of domestic financial development. 
 
 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, I examine the impact of financial system integration on the ability of an industry to grow faster.   
The analysis yields three main findings.  First,  the results presented in this paper provide empirical support for 
the idea that  financial integration enhances growth of industries, regardless of their characteristics.  This is, I 
find a positive first order effect of financial openness on growth in real value added.   Second, my results suggest 
that economic sectors that are relatively more in need of external finance grow disproportionately faster in more 
financially open countries.  This industry-specific effect of financial openness holds especially for the more 
mature firms in the sector, this is firms more than ten years old.  A possible explanation is the integration of 
financial systems positively affects the financing needs of the older firms in a country, because the problem of 
information acquisition for these firms is less severe.  The evidence also suggests that the industry-specific effect 
of financial openness is mainly driven by the developing countries in the sample.  Third, the econometric results 
in this paper indicate that once I control for domestic financial development, the industry-specific effect of 
financial openness decreases substantially.    Therefore, I also test whether the integration of financial systems 
improved growth by increasing the level of domestic financial development.  I find evidence in favour of this 
indirect  transmission  channel  of  financial  integration.    In  particular,  the  results  show  a  statistically  and 
economically  significant  effect  of  financial  openness  on  the  development  of  the  domestic  financial  system.  
Moreover, in contrast to Klein and Olivei (1999), I find evidence of international financial integration promoting 






                                                 
32 I also did the regression for the sub-sample of Latin American countries.  For this sub-sample I find no significant effect of financial 
liberalization on the growth of liquid liabilities or private credit.  This result is in line with the evidence found by Klein and Olivei. 
33 I also included an interaction term between Share and a dummy variable indicating one when the country is a LAC.  The coefficient on this 
interaction term was negative but not significantly different from zero.   22 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable                                   Num. Obs.   Mean    Std. Dev.    Min.     Max. 
 
 Sample 1 
 
Growth Value Addedi,j         1081       0.382    1.015     -4.277    9.127 
Fraction of Value Addedi,j        1152      0.038    0.048        0.000     0.561 
External Dependencei  (Old Firms)      1125      0.037    0.198     -0.572     0.329 
External Dependencei  (All Firms)      1215       0.243    0.330    -0.451     1.140 
Financial Depthj             38       0.937     0.655        0.195     2.456    
Private Creditj           45      0.554     0.371        0.076    1.731 
Stock Market Capitalizationj        38       0.331     0.353        0.008     1.382 
Liquid Liabilitiesj           45      0.551     0.277        0.153    1.721   
Sharej             45        0.330     0.390        0.000     1.000 
Quinn88j             38       2.434    1.027        0.500     4.000 
Quinn82-88j          38      2.288    0.960        0.500     4.000 
 
 
 Sample 2 
 
Growth Financial Depthj              42     0.652     0.567    -0.831    2.368 
Growth  Private Creditj              65     0.258     0.666   -1.629    1.932 
Growth Stock Market Capitalizationj         42     1.659     1.088   -0.469    6.098 
Growth  Liquid Liabilitiesj           65      0.259     0.423    -0.980    1.282 
Log of per capita GDPj          65     8.083     0.026     6.199    9.407 
No Restriction 1985j         65         0.569      0.499       0.000     1.000 
  
Note: Growth  Value Added is the rate of growth  of real value added for each industrial sector in each of the countries for the period 1980 to 
1997.  Fraction of Value Added is industry i’s share  of manufacturing in country j in 1980 .  External Dependence refers to the borrowing 
needs of all establishments (all firms), and of establishments 10 years and older (old firms).   Financial Depth is the ratio of the sum of 
private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP.  Private Credit is the value of loans made by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector divided by GDP.  Stock market capitalization is the value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges 
divided by GDP. Liquid liabilities is the ratio of currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries to  GDP.  The financial development measures are averages for the period 1980 to 1997. Share is the proportion of years 
between 1980 and 1995 in which there were no restrictions on capital mobility. Quinn88 is Quinn’s 0-4  measure of capital account intensity 
in 1988.   Quinn82-88 is the average of  Quinn’s intensity measure for the years 1982 and 1988.  Growth Financial Depth is obtained as a 
difference in logs between financial depth in 1997 and financial depth in 1980.  Growth  Private Credit is the log of private credit in 1997 
less the log of private credit in 1980. Growth Stock Market Capitalization is the growth rate of equity market capitalization for the period 
1980-1997.  Growth Liquid Liabilities is the growth rate of liquid liabilities over the period 1980 to 1997.  Log of per capita GDP is the 
logarithm of per capita income in 1980.  No Restriction 1985 is a dummy variable indicating one when there were no restrictions on capital 
mobility in 1985. 
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Table 2.  List of Countries and Financial Integration Rule-based Measures 
 
Country    Share         Quinn82-88         Quinn88  Country      Share          Quinn82-88       Quinn88 
 
Argentina  0.1875    1.25    2  Malaysia              1         2.25    2.5 
Australia   0.75    2.5    3  Mauritius  0 
Austria    0.3125    3    3  Mexico    0.125   
Bangladesh  0          Morocco    0         0.5    0.5 
Bolivia    0.6875    2.25    3  Netherlands  1         3.5    4 
Brazil    0    1.5    1.5  New Zealand  0.75         3    3.5 
Botswana  0          Nepal    0 
Canada    1          Niger    0.0625 
Chile    0    2    2  Nigeria    0         1.5    2 
Colombia  0    1.5    1.5  Norway   0.0625         2.5    3 
Costa Rica  0.1875    1.75    2  Pakistan   0         1.25   1.5 
Cote d’Ivoire  0          Panama    1         3.5    3 
Denmark  0.5    3.5    4  Paraguay   0.125         1.5    1.5 
Dominican R.  0    1.5    2  Peru    0.4375         1    0.5 
Ecuador   0.75    2.25    2.5  Philippines  0         1    1 
Egypt    0    1.5    1.5  Portugal   0.1875         2    2.5 
Finland    0.3125    2.25    2.5  Rwanda   0 
France    0.375    2.75    3  Saudi A.     1 
Germany  1    4    4  Singapore  1         4    4 
Greece    0    2.5    3  South Africa  0         1.5    1.5 
Iceland    0          Spain    0.125         2.5    3 
India    0    1    1  Sri Lanka  0         0.5    0.5 
Indonesia  1    2.5    2.5  Sweden    0.1875         3    3 
Iran    0    1.5    1.5  Switzerland  1         4    4 
Ireland    0.25    3    3  Syr. Arab Rep.   0 
Israel    0    1.75    1.5  Thailand   0         1.5    1.5 
Italy    0.375    3.5    4  Trinidad   0.125 
Jamaica    0          U.K    1         4    4 
Japan    0.9375    2.5    2.5  U.S.     1         4    4 
Jordan    0    1.5    1.5  Uruguay   0.8125         3.75   3.5 
Kenya    0           Venezuela  0.25         2.5    2 
Korea    0    2    2   Zimbabwe  0 
Madagascar  0 
 
 
Note: This table reports for each country the indicator for financial openness.  Share is  the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in 
which a country had no restrictions on the capital account.  The data on capital account restrictions are from the IMF AREAER.   Quinn88 is 
Quinn’s 0-4  measure of capital account intensity in 1988.   Quinn82-88 is the average of Quinn’s intensity measure for the years 1982 and 
1988.   
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Table 3. Correlations  
 
 
Variables               Financial           Private         Stock M.    Liquid           Share        Quinn88        Quinn82-88  Human         Trade        Rule of Law         
                Depth            Credit    Cap.    Liabilities                 Capital 
 
Financial Depth  1.00 
Private Credit  0.90***    1.00 
Stock M. Cap.  0.89***    0.60***    1.00 
Liquid Liabilities  0.68***    0.73***    0.48***    1.00 
Share    0.51***    0.37**    0.47***    0.29**    1.00     
Quinn88   0.50***    0.53***    0.28    0.32*    0.56***    1.00 
Quinn82-88  0.51***    0.54***    0.31*    0.32*    0.63***    0.96***    1.00 
Human Capital  0.49***    0.62***    0.24    0.22    0.41***    0.54***    0.54***    1.00 
Trade    0.41**    0.21    0.53***    0.33**    0.20    0.25    0.29*    -0.10           1.00   
Rule of Law  0.61***    0.72***    0.32**    0.50***    0.35**    0.71***    0.65***    0.74***           0.18           1.00
   
   
Note:  Financial Depth is the ratio of the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP.  Private Credit is the value of loans made by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private 
sector divided by GDP.  Stock market capitalization is the value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. Liquid liabilities is the ratio of currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of 
banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to  GDP.  Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which a country had  no restrictions on her capital account.  Quinn88 is Quinn’s 0-4  measure of capital 
account intensity in 1988.   Quinn82-88 is the average of Quinn’s intensity measure for the years 1982 and 1988.  Human Capital is the average years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years in 1980.   
Trade is the ratio of the sum of real imports and exports to GDP, average over 1980-1995.  Rule of Law is a measure of the law and order tradition of a country and  ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, 
weak law and order tradition, average over 1982-95.   
Three stars denote that the correlations are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level 
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Note: The financial openness measure is the IMF’s dummy variable which indicates one when there are no restrictions on the capital account 






Table 4.  Instrumental Variables for Financial Integration 
 
 
                          Share                                                 Quinn88  
                     
Regressors                           (a)                 (b)                 (c)                   (d)       (e)                   (f) 
 
 
No restriction in 1985  0.832***                             0.792***         1.263***                0.870*** 
      (22.29)                              (16.69)          (5.20)            (4.00) 
Latin America           -0.237***        0.004               -1.239***         -1.01*** 
              (-1.98)            (0.05)                               (-4.81)               (-4.27) 
Africa             -0.525***        -0.185***                         -1.941***         -1.574*** 
                          (-6.16)            (-4.49)                              (-6.16)               (-4.86) 
Asia                                                  -0.280**         -0.138***                         -1.547 ***        -1.381*** 
                                                  (-1.99)            (-3.19)                (-5.52)              (6.02) 
             
       
R-Squared    0.81           0.22               0.85    0.30             0.52             0.65 
Number of Obs.    65            65                 65    49                49                49 
Note: The dependent variable is a proxy for the level of  financial openness.  Financial openness is Share in columns (a)-(c), and Quinn88 in 
columns (d)-(f). Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which a country had  no restrictions on her capital account.  
Quinn88 is Quinn’s 0-4 measure of capital account intensity.    No Restriction 1985 is a dummy variable indicating one when there were no 
restrictions on capital mobility in 1985.  Latin America, Africa and Asia are dummy variables for respectively Latin American, African and 
Asian countries. As can be seen from Table 2, missing values in the Quinn88 indicator restrict the sample to 49 countries.  A constant is 
included in all the regressions, but I do not report it.  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are 
reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-
percent level and one star at the 10-percent level 
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Table 5 .  Economy-wide Effect of Financial Openness  
 
 
                                
Regressors                                              (a)                     (b)                        (c)                     (d)              (e)    (f)    (g)    (h) 
 
Fraction of Value Added    -2.624***  -2.178***  -1.985***  -1.998***  -2.854***  -2.373***  -2.146***  -2.141*** 
        (-3.37)    (-2.92)    (-2.74)    (-2.78)    (-3.55)    (-3.13)    (-2.89)    (-2.85) 
Financial Depth      0.211***   0.321***   0.304***   0.204***   0.275***   0.357***   0.331***   0.282***  
        (3.80)    (5.65)    (5.40)    (3.93)    (4.99)    (6.28)    (5.89)    (4.95) 
Share          0.676***   0.366***   0.352***   0.245**    0.279**    0.188*    0.200*    0.169 
        (5.95)    (3.07)    (2.88)    (1.96)    (2.50)    (1.68)    (1.77)    (1.51) 
Ext. Dep. * Share                      0.436*    0.444**    0.370*    0.374* 
                        (1.99)    (2.10)    (1.74)    (1.77) 
Log of per capita GDP    -0.478***  -0.328***  -0.375***  -0.433***  -0.443***  -0.338***  -0.407***  -0.427*** 
        (-10.72)    (-7.13)    (-6.42)    (-7.24)    (-10.07)    (-7.75)    (-6.95)    (-7.08) 
Government Size          -0.047***  -0.045***  -0.046***      -0.037***  -0.032***  -0.032*** 
            (-7.01)    (-6.68)    (-7.08)        (-5.87)    (-5.11)    (-4.98) 
Human Capital              0.010    0.055***           0.018    0.036* 
                (0.57)    (2.78)            (1.00)    (1.71) 
Trade                    0.002***               0.001**   
                                                              (3.89)                (2.07) 
 
Industry Dummies      Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Country Dummies                    No    No    No    No    No    No    No    No    
  
R-Squared      0.19    0.26    0.29    0.31    0.20    0.24    0.27    0.27 
Number of Obs.      847    821    781    781    847    821    781    781 
Note:  Instrumental Variable Regression.  The dependent variable in all columns is  the growth rate of real value added for each industry in each country for the period 1980 to 1997.  Fraction of Value Added is industry 
i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Financial Depth is the ratio of  the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP.  Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which there 
are no restrictions on the capital account in country j. External Dependence refers to the borrowing needs of the median firm in industry i.  Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of per capita income in 1980 in country 
j.  Government size is the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, average over 1980-1995.  Human Capital is the average years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years in 1980.   Trade is the ratio of the 
sum of real imports and exports to GDP, average over 1980-1995.  The instruments for financial integration are the dummy variables: No restriction in 1985, Latin America, Africa and Asia.   Missing values of 
Financial Depth restrict the sample.  Similarly, the inclusion of the indicator of human capital and government expenditures implies that countries are dropped from the sample. Industry dummy variables are included in 
all regressions.  The coefficients for the constant and the industry-fixed effects  are not reported.  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  Three stars 
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Table 6 .   Industry-specific Effect of Financial Openness 
 
                          
                                                                                                                 External Financial Dependence of 
                                                                       All firms                                                                                                       Old Firms 
                     
Regressors                                             (a)                      (b)                        (c)               (d)     (e)     (f)     (g)    (h) 
 
Fraction of Value Added    -2.330***  -1.357*    -2.363***  -1.936**   -2.424***  -1.353*    -2.434***  -2.061***  
        (-3.27)    (-1.90)    (-3.29)    (-2.44)    (-3.41)    (-1.91)    (-3.41)               (-2.48) 
Ext. Dep.*Financial Depth    0.259**        0.185    0.182*    0.654***       0.401*    0.476** 
        (2.29)        (1.39)    (1.78)    (3.06)        (1.67)    (2.21) 
Ext. Dep.*Share          0.326*    0.243            0.911***   0.779**     
            (1.92)    (1.24)            (2.90)    (2.20) 
Ext. Dep. *Quinn82-88                0.031                0.118 
                    (0.94)                (1.57) 
 
 
Country Dummies      Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Industry Dummies      Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
 
Hausman Test (p-value)        1.31 (0.25)        0.30 (0.58)          0.26 (0.61)      0.55 (0.46)  0.53 (0.47)  0.00 (0.98) 
 
 
R-Squared      0.55    0.48    0.55    0.60    0.53    0.46    0.54    0.58 
Number of Obs.      847    1038    847    729    784    960    784    674 
Note: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation. The dependent variable in all columns is the growth rate of real value added for each industry in each country for the period 1980 to 1997.  Fraction of Value Added is industry 
i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Financial Depth is the ratio of the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP.  Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which there 
are no restrictions on the capital account in country j. Quinn82-88 is the average of Quinn’s intensity measure for the years 1982 and 1988.  External Dependence refers to the borrowing needs of  all firms (column (a)-
(d)) and the financial needs of the more mature firms (column (e)-(h)) in industry i.  Missing values of Financial Depth restrict the sample.  Similarly, the inclusion of the Quinn82-88 index implies that countries are 
dropped from the sample.  All regressions contain industry dummies and country dummies, but I do not report their coefficient estimates.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the use of instrumental 
variables does not change the estimation outcome.  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the coefficients are statistically 
different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 7. Robustness Test: Measures Financial Development 
 
                                                  External Financial Dependence of 
 
                                                                                       All Firms                          Old Firms 
 
Regressors                                      (a)                  (b)                   (c)                  (d)                 (e)                        (f)                       (g)                     (h) 
 
Fraction of Value Added                         -1.953***  -2.238***  -1.973***  -2.307     -2.021***          -2.282***          -2.007***       -2.356*** 
                                                           (-2.79)    (-3.18)    (-2.81)    (-3.24)    (-2.87)              (-3.26)         (-2.84)             (-3.33)        
Ext. Dep.*Private Credit                                    0.439**         0.350        0.955**             0.639                           
                                                                       (2.09)          (1.43)        (2.32)             (1.37)                          
Ext. Dep. * Stock Market Capitalization                  0.377**         0.230                  1.041***               0.591*                            
                                                                                     (2.07)        (1.16)                  (3.03)                           (1.79) 
Ext. Dep.* Share                                                                                      0.239    0.302*                      0.793**          0.879***                           
    (1.13)    (1.67)                                                           (2.12)               (2.73)
           
               
Country Dummies             Yes                Yes              Yes         Yes                 Yes    Yes    Yes             Yes 
Industry Dummies                                      Yes    Yes              Yes                    Yes                 Yes    Yes    Yes             Yes 
   
Hausman Test (p-value)                                                                                        0.19 (0.67)        0.00 (0.98)                              1.80 (0.18)        0.24 (0.62) 
 
 
R-squared        0.49    0.55    0.49    0.55    0.47    0.53          0.48    0.54 
Number of Observations      990    847    990    847    915    784           915    784 
 
Note: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation.  The dependent variable in all columns is  the growth rate of real value added for each industry in each country for the period 1980 to 1997.  Fraction of Value Added is industry 
i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Private Credit is the value of loans made by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP.  Stock market capitalization is the 
value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP.  Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which there are no restrictions on the capital account in country j. External 
Dependence refers to the borrowing needs of  all firms (column (a)-(d)) and the financial needs of the more mature firms (column (e)-(h)) in industry i.  Missing values of Stock Market Capitalization restrict the sample.   
All regressions contain industry dummies and country dummies, but I do not report their coefficient estimates.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the use of instrumental variables does not change the 
estimation outcome.  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1-
percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 8.  Robustness Test: Other Country Characteristics 
 
 
                                              Human Capital             Economic Dev.          Institutional Dev.            Trade Openness   
 
Regressors                        (a)                (b)         (c)        (d)       
 
Fraction of Value Added              -2.093***         -2.024***      -2.254***    -2.019***     
                   (-2.82)           (-2.85)      (-3.17)      (-2.86)       
Ext. Dep. *Private Credit                                    0.499              0.333      0.518      0.610       
                                                                       (0.88)             (0.60)      (0.85)      (1.33) 
Ext. Dep.*Share                                                0.704*                         0.699*       0.743**    0.721**   
                                                                       (1.81)                (1.79)                   (1.98)      (1.90)      
Ext. Dep. * Human Capital                                0.024         
                                                                       (0.36)     
Ext. Dep.* Log of per capita GDP                0.213 
                     (1.11) 
Ext. Dep.*Rule of Law                       0.042 
                          (0.36) 
Ext. Dep.*Trade                           0.004* 
(1.39) 
                                     
Country Dummies                 Yes             Yes       Yes      Yes   
Industry Dummies                 Yes                         Yes       Yes      Yes           
 
Hausman Test (p-value)      2.41 (0.12)       1.46 (0.23)    2.14 (0.14)    1.76 (0.185) 
 
R-squared                 0.46            0.47       0.48      0.48       
Number of Observations                    877            915             895      915     
             
Note: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation.  The dependent variable in all columns is  the growth rate of real value added for each industry in each country for the period 1980 to 1997.  Fraction of Value Added is industry 
i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Private Credit is the value of loans made by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private sector divided by GDP.  Share is the proportion of years 
between 1980 and 1995 in which there are no restrictions on the capital account in country j. External Dependence refers to the borrowing needs of the more mature firms in industry i.  Human capital is the average for 
1980 of the years of schooling attained by the population over 25 years of age.  Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of per capita income in 1980.  Rule of Law is a measure of the law and order tradition of a country 
and  ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition, average over 1982-95.  Trade is the ratio of the sum of real imports and exports to GDP, average over 1980-1995.  Missing values 
of Human Capital an Rule of Law restrict the sample.   All regressions contain industry dummies and country dummies, but I do not report their coefficient estimates.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null 
that the use of instrumental variables does not change the estimation outcome.  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the 
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Table 9.  Industry-specific Effect: Heterogeneous Effect across Countries (Share) 
 
 
         All Countries                        Developing Countries                                          Industrialized countries 
   
         OLS                 IV                           OLS                                             IV                                       OLS                                      IV 
          
Regressors             (a)             (b)    (c)          (d)                  (e)                  (f)                    (g)                 (h)                  (i)                 (j) 
 
Fraction of Value Added        -2.341***    -2.325***         -1.961**        -2.867***            -1.962**         -2.865***         -1.015              -1.904*              -0.896         -1.941** 
             (-3.28)              (-3.27)              (-2.16)             (-3.25)                (-2.16)           (-3.24)             (-1.04)              (-1.94)               (-0.93)         (-1.95)  
Ext. Dep.*Financial Depth           0.451**             0.554**                                   0.591**                                    0.503**                                   -0.022                                   0.384  
                                                 (1.96)                (2.52)                                      (2.42)                                       (1.99)                                      (-0.05)                                   (0.85)                            
Ext. Dep.* Share                        1.384***           1.167**            1.355***          1.448***             1.316**          1.809***         -0.029                0.189               -0.539         -0.818  
                                                 (3.20)                (2.46)               (3.08)              (3.12)                  (2.07)             (3.35)             (-0.07)               (0.34)               (-0.93)         (-1.11) 
Ext. Dep.*Share*Developed         -1.100**           -1.245**            
            (-2.50)               (-2.32)            
               
Country Dummies                 Yes       Yes    Yes           Yes         Yes                Yes                 Yes                   Yes                   Yes                Yes 
Industry Dummies                  Yes       Yes    Yes           Yes         Yes    Yes                Yes                    Yes                  Yes                Yes 
 
Hausman Test (p-value)         0.56 (0.45)                                 0.04 (0.85)      0.57 (0.44)                                                          2.36 (0.12)        2.47 (0.12) 
 
R-squared           0.54                   0.54                   0.48                 0.56                   0.48                0.56               0.52                  0.52                  0.52             0.51  
Number of Observations         784                    784                    573                  446                   573                 446                387                   338                   387             338 
     
Note: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variable Estimation.  The dependent variable in all columns is  the growth rate of real value added for each industry in each country for the period 1980 to 1997.  Fraction 
of Value Added is industry i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Financial Depth is the ratio of the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP.  Share is the proportion of years between 
1980 and 1995 in which there are no restrictions on the capital account in country j. External Dependence refers to the borrowing needs of the more mature firms in industry i.  Missing values of Financial Depth restrict 
the sample.   All regressions contain industry dummies and country dummies, but I do not report their coefficient estimates.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the use of instrumental variables does 
not change the estimation outcome.  Instruments in column (b) are: regional dummy variables and No restriction in 1985.  In column (e)-(f) and (i)-(j) the instruments is No restriction in 1985.  Standard errors are robust 
to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one 
star at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 10.  Industry-specific Effect : Heterogeneous Effect across Countries (Quinn88) 
 
 
         All Countries                        Developing Countries                                          Industrialized countries 
   
         OLS                 IV                           OLS                                             IV                                       OLS                                     IV 
          
Regressors              (a)              (b)    (c)          (d)                  (e)                  (f)                    (g)                 (h)                  (i)                 (j) 
 
Fraction of Value Added       -1.799**  -1.791**           -2.118**        -2.064**                -2.097**       -1.921*               -0.955            -1.884*           -0.796          -1.894* 
            (-2.23)             (-2.22)              (-2.05)             (-2.01)                   (-2.03)          (-1.85)                (-0.97)           (-1.85)            (-0.81)          (-1.88)    
Ext. Dep.*Financial Depth          0.381*              0.345*                                    0.556**                                      0.139                                       0.084                                  0.257        
                                                (1.88)               (1.74)                                      (2.16)                                        (0.43)                                       (0.24)                                  (0.55) 
Ext. Dep.* Quinn88                  0.483**            0.576**            0.632***         0.541**                 0.881*          1.355***             -0.217            -0.124             -0.576           -0.75 
                                                (2.47)               (2.37)               (2.97)              (2.47)                    (1.90)            (3.00)                 (-0.72)           (-0.35)            (-0.96)          (-1.55)    
Ext. Dep.*Quinn88*Developed   -0.239**           -0.274**          
           (-2.15)              (-2.33)           
               
Country Dummies                 Yes      Yes    Yes           Yes         Yes                 Yes                Yes                  Yes                 Yes                Yes 
Industry Dummies                 Yes       Yes    Yes           Yes         Yes    Yes                 Yes                 Yes                 Yes                Yes 
   
Hausman Test (p-value)        0.33 (0.57)                                  0.58 (0.45)     3.88 (0.05)                                                       0.78 (0.38)         2.54 (0.11) 
 
R-squared         0.59                  0.59                    0.51                0.61                      0.51               0.59                     0.53             0.52                 0.52              0.50  
Number of Observations        657                  657                     430                434                       430                343                       363              314                  363              314  
 
Note: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variable Estimation.  The dependent variable in all columns is  the growth rate of real value added for each industry in each country for the period 1980 to 1997.  Fraction 
of Value Added is industry i’s share of manufacturing in country j in 1980.  Financial Depth is the ratio of the sum of private credit and stock market capitalization to GDP.  Quinn88 is Quinn’s 0-4 measure of capital 
account intensity.  External Dependence refers to the borrowing needs of the more mature firms in industry i.  All regressions contain industry dummies and country dummies, but I do not report their coefficient 
estimates.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the use of instrumental variables does not change the estimation outcome.  Instruments in column (b) are: regional dummy variables and No restriction in 
1985.  In column (e)-(f) and (i)-(j) the instrument is No restriction in 1985.  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the 
coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level.  32 
Table 11.  Financial Development Effect (Share) 
 
     
   Growth Financial Depth                       Growth Private Credit                Growth Stock Market Cap.        Growth Liquid Liabilities 
 
         OLS       IV      OLS        IV       OLS       IV       OLS       IV 
Regressors      (a)                         (b)                        (c)                         (d)                        (e)                        (f)                         (g)                       (h) 
 
Log of initial Fin. Dev.  -0.221    -0.240      -0.336***  -0.345***     -0.551***  -0.553***     -0.321***    -0.324*** 
      (-1.44)    (-1.58)    (-2.78)    (-2.90)    (-3.65)    (-4.42)     (-3.53)    (-3.60) 
Share       0.520**   0.797***   0.694***   0.866***      0.441    0.836**       0.408***  0.472*** 
      (2.02)    (3.55)    (3.57)    (4.27)     (1.01)    (2.41)     (3.53)    (3.76) 
Log of per capita GDP  -0.158    -0.210       -0.006    -0.036       -0.060    -0.149      -0.045      -0.057 
      (-1.32)    (-1.58)    (-0.05)    (-0.30)    (-0.42)    (-0.85)     (-0.84)    (-1.07) 
 
Hausman Test (p-value)               8.66 (0.01)                2.32 (0.13)       10.34 (0.00)      0.83(0.37) 
 
R-squared      0.23        0.19        0.60                     0.24       
Observations         41           64          41                   64     
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variable Estimation.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the growth in financial development over the period 1980 to 1997.   Proxies for financial development 
are Financial Depth, Private Credit, Stock market capitalization, and Liquid liabilities.  Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which there were no restrictions on the capital account in country j. Log 
of per capita GDP is the logarithm of per capita income in 1980.  A constant is included in all the regressions, but I do not report the coefficient estimate.   The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the use of 
instrumental variables does not change the estimation outcome.   In the IV regression, the instruments for financial openness are regional dummies for Asia, Africa and Latin America and a dummy variable which 
equals one if a country had no restrictions on her capital account in 1985  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the coefficients 
are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level.   33 
 Table 12.  Financial Development Effect (Quinn82-88) 
 
     
 Growth Financial Depth                          Growth Private Credit                Growth Stock Market Cap.      Growth Liquid Liabilities 
 
        OLS       IV      OLS        IV      OLS       IV      OLS       IV 
Regressors       (a)                        (b)                        (c)                         (d)                       (e)                         (f)                        (g)                        (h) 
 
 
Log of  Initial Fin. Dev.  -0.134    -0.229      -0.261*    -0.297*       -0.522***  -0.486**     -0.315***    -0.349*** 
      (-0.67)    (-0.90)    (-1.75)    (-1.81)    (-3.20)    (-2.57)     (-2.84)    (-3.29) 
Quinn82-88     0.051    0.683**        0.191*    0.688**       -0.019    0.853**       0.133*    0.406*** 
      (0.31)    (2.40)    (1.65)    (2.62)    (-0.07)    (2.12)     (1.74)    (2.81) 
Log of per capita GDP  -0.144    -0.603**     -0.139    -0.548*        0.059    -0.681      -0.105      -0.330** 
      (-0.93)    (-2.02)    (-0.88)    (-1.95)    (0.25)    (-1.56)     (-1.05)    (-2.52) 
 
Hausman Test (p-value)              16.50 (0.00)                8.45 (0.01)       18.04 (0.00)      5.20 (0.03) 
 
R-squared      0.10        0.12        0.51                     0.19       
Observations         36           49          36                   49     
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variable Estimation.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the growth in financial development over the period 1980 to 1997.   Proxies for financial development 
are Financial Depth, Private Credit, Stock market capitalization , and Liquid liabilities. Quinn82-88 is the average of  Quinn’s intensity measure for the years 1982 and 1988.   Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of 
per capita income in 1980.  A constant is included in all the regressions, but I do not report the coefficient estimate.   The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the use of instrumental variables does not 
change the estimation outcome.   In the IV regression, the instruments for financial openness are regional dummies for Asia, Africa and Latin America and a dummy variable which equals one if a country had no 
restrictions on her capital account in 1985  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the coefficients are statistically different from 
zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 13. Financial Development Effect: Heterogeneous Effect across Countries 
 
           
Industrialized Countries            Developing Countries 
 
       Growth Private Credit                Growth liquid Liabilities     Growth Private Credit     Growth Liquid Liabilities 
 
 
          OLS         IV       OLS        IV      OLS         IV       OLS       IV 
Regressors                               (a)                        (b)                       (c)                        (d)                       (e)                           (f)                        (g)                      (h) 
 
Log of initial Fin. Dev.  -0.589***   -0.622***  -0.534**   -0.549***  -0.243       -0.236    -0.276**   -0.268** 
      (-2.88)    (-3.43)    (-2.66)    (-2.90)    (-1.39)    (-1.38)    (-2.19)    (-2.19) 
Share      0.835***   1.005***   0.538**    0.585***   0.626**    0.885***   0.412***   0.532*** 
      (3.54)    (3.87)    (2.70)    (2.99)    (2.30)    (3.10)    (2.92)    (3.60) 
Log of per capita GDP  0.396    0.296    -0.399*    -0.434    -0.036    -0.072    -0.069      -0.087 
      (0.82)    (0.58)    (-1.75)    (-2.00)    (-0.23)    (-0.45)    (-0.80)    (-0.95) 
 
Hausman Test (p-value)    2.63 (0.12)      0.46 (0.50)      1.67 (0.20)      0.97 (0.33) 
 
R-squared      0.53        0.53                    0.12        0.19     
Observations         21           21          43        43     
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimation.  The dependent variable in all regressions is the growth in financial development over the period 1980 to 1997.   Proxies for financial development 
are Financial Depth, Private Credit, Stock market capitalization , and Liquid liabilities.  Share is the proportion of years between 1980 and 1995 in which there were no restrictions on the capital account in country j. 
Log of per capita GDP is the logarithm of per capita income in 1980.  A constant is included in all the regressions, but I do not report the coefficient estimate.   The Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic tests the null that the 
use of instrumental variables does not change the estimation outcome.   In the IV regression, the instruments for financial openness are regional dummies for Asia, Africa and Latin America and a dummy variable 
which equals one if a country had no restrictions on her capital account in 1985  Standard errors are robust to unknown form of heteroskedasticity and t-statistics reported in parenthesis.  Three stars denote that the 
coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level, two stars at the 5-percent level and one star at the 10-percent level.   35 
 
Study  Countries  Financial Openness 
Measure 












- Dummy variable 
taking the value one 
when capital controls 
are in place (IMF) 
-  Growth  in  GDP/cap  for  five  non-
overlapping periods during 1966-1989 
 
* IV estimation 
- No evidence of a robust correlation of capital account 






- Change in Quinn 
Index between 1988 
and 1958 
- Growth in GDP/cap  
 
* Data averaged over period 1960-1989 
Cross Section, OLS 
-  Capital  account  liberalization  is  robustly  and  positively 







- Share 1975-1989  - Growth in GDP/cap  
 
* Data averaged over period 1975-1989 
Cross Section, OLS 




  - Share 1966-1995 
- Quinn Index 
-  Flows  of  Capital  as 
share of GDP 
- Growth in GDP/cap  
- Gross domestic investment/GDP 
 
* Data averaged over period 1985-1997 
 Cross section, OLS and IV 
- Little evidence that growth or investment is higher in more 







- Share 1986-1995  - Growth in Financial Development  
- Growth in GDP/cap  
 
* Data are averaged over the period 1986-
1995 
 Cross Section, OLS and IV 
- Significant effect of capital account openness on financial 
deepness, however the results are largely driven by the 
developed countries in the sample 







-  Dates  at  which 
countries  liberalized 
restrictions  on 
international  capital 
flows 
-  Foreign  bank  share 
(number) 
- Stock market value traded ratio 
- Before tax profits / total assets 
- Overhead costs / total assets 
- Liberalizing restrictions on international capital flows tend 
to enhance stock market liquidity 
- Greater foreign bank presence is negatively associated with 








- Quinn Index in 1973 
and 1988 
- Change in Quinn 
Index between 1988 
and 1973 
- Growth in GDP/cap over the period 
1980-1989 
 
* Cross section, WLS, IV 
- Open capital account positively affects growth only after a 









- Official equity market 
liberalization dates 
- Growth in GDP/cap 
-  Consumption 
- Size of government sector 
- Trade balance 
- Cost of capital 
- Efficiency of investment 
-  Although  financial  liberalization  furthers  financial 
development, measures of financial development fail to fully 









- Quinn Index 
- Change in Quinn 
Index between 1988 
and 1973 
 
- Growth in GDP/cap 
 
* Data averaged over period 1980-1989 
Cross section, OLS, IV 
-  Little  evidence  that  capital  account  liberalization  has 
different  effects  in  high-  and  low-income  countries  /  in 
high- and low-financially developed countries 
- Evidence that capital account liberalization has no effect in 
countries  with  weak  contract  and  law  enforcement  but 









- IMF restriction  
- Quinn Index 
- Stock of capital flows 
- Flow of capital 
- Stock of capital 
inflows 
- Inflows of capital 
 
- Growth of GDP/cap  
 
*  Data  averaged  over  the  period  1980-
2000 
Cross-section, OLS and IV 
 
*  Data  averaged  over  5-year  non 
overlapping  periods  during  1976-2000 
period 
GMM 
- International financial integration is completely irrelevant 






- Share 1976-1995 
- Quinn Index (average 
over 1973,1982 and 
1988) 
- Growth GDP/cap 
 
* Data averaged over 1976-1995 
Cross Section OLS and IV  
- Evidence of an inverted-U  shaped relationship between 
the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness 
and income per capita 
- Evidence of an inverted-U  shaped relationship between 
the responsiveness of growth to capital account openness 














- IMF restriction 
- Share 1980-1990 
- Quinn Index (1982) 
- dummy equals one if 
equity market is 
liberalized to foreign 
investors  
- capital flows/GDP 
- capital stocks/GDP 
- Growth rate of real value added  
- Growth rate number of firms  
- Growth rate real output  
in industry j in country k  
 
* Data averaged over period 1980-1990  
Cross section, OLS and IV 
- Industries highly dependent on external financing do not 
experience higher growth in value added in countries with 
liberalized financial markets 
-  Liberalization  does  increase  the  growth  rates  of 
production  and  number  of  firms  among  externally 
dependent industries, given that the countries have reached 













A.  Simulate  the  impact 
of  raising  the  level  of 
financial  development 
in  each  EU  country  to 
the US level of financial 
development 
B.  Simulate  the  impact 
of  raising  the 
institutional 
determinants  of 
financial  development 
to  the  highest  EU 
standard 
 
- Growth rate of real value added  
- Growth rate of real output  
- Growth rate of number of firms 
- Investment as share of output 
in industry  j in country k   
 
* Data averaged over period 1981-1991 
* Data averaged over period 1981-1995 
Cross section, OLS and IV 
-  Financial  development  matters  for  economic  growth  in 
the  manufacturing  sector,  and  these  effects  have  not 
weakened in the early 90s 
- Financial integration can have potentially large effects on 
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